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Abstract
Italy makes for a very interesting case study of the impact of social variables on economic
performance. Across its provinces, diﬀerences in social and cultural attitudes seem associated to
large diﬀerences in economic development. We analyze the importance of some social variables
on industrialization and on employment creation across 95 Italian provinces during the period
1951-1991. On one hand we ﬁnd little evidence that civic involvement (Social Capital) was
associated with industrial and economic development. On the other hand we ﬁnd strong evidence
that organized crime, measured as high murder rates, was negatively correlated with industrial
and economic development. We use measures of murder rates in the distant past to suggest that
the correlation captures, at least in part, a stable and possibly causal link between organized
crime and lack of employment growth.
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11 Introduction
European leaders and politicians are extremely concerned with the economic development of re-
gions within their countries, perceiving that liberalization in the movements of goods and factors
across national boundaries increases the importance of regional economies and provides them with
unprecedented challenges and opportunities. ”The European Union is one of the most prosperous
economic areas in the world” is stated at the very beginning of the document on Regional Policies
by the European Commission [9] ”but the disparities between its .. various 250 regions... are
striking”. Among economists, improvements in the collection of data at the regional level has given
a new impulse to the study of regions as the basic economic units acting within a borderless Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. Recent models describing the economic geography, industrialization
and development of interdependent regions have shown that some features that give regions an
initial advantage may result in stronger agglomeration economies and virtuous development cycles
as trade becomes freer across them (e.g. Krugman [22] and then Krugman and Venables [23] and
Fujita et al. [11]). On the other hand, with increasing economic integration, some forces such
as technological diﬀusion, are set in motion that should promote convergence and development of
backward regions (see for instance Chapter 7 of Baldwin et al. [1]). There is a growing perception,
however, that the roots of diﬀerential economic success of regions may depend, at least in part, on
some factors that are harder to transport than physical capital, human capital or technology. The
long persistence of disparities within the same country (North-South of Italy, Scotland-England,
East-West Germany) reminds Europeans that neither free markets nor common institutions are
enough, by themselves, to promote speedy development and convergence. Social factors may play
a crucial role: regions better endowed with ”good” social characteristics may have a signiﬁcant and
long lasting economic advantage on other regions.
This paper is a case study inquiring into economic and social determinants of local industrial
and economic development. We look at Italy and at the economic development of its provinces
during the post Word War II (1951-1991) era. During this period the country went from being
a largely rural, war-weary and still developing country to being the ﬁfth largest economy in the
world. Our goal is to identify, once we control for economic forces, important social factors that
aﬀected agglomeration economies. Such forces allowed some provinces within Italy to take full
2advantage of the economic take oﬀ, while prevented others from doing so, leaving them in a still
semi-developed economic condition. Three characteristics contribute to make our data particularly
interesting. First, Italy due to diﬀerent historical roots between its regions and often between its
cities, exhibits large variation of some social and cultural characteristics. Second, in spite of the
common administration, common institutions and free mobility of goods and factors within the
country since 1949, the economic performances across provinces has been rather diﬀerent. The
convergence in productivity and in employment rates across provinces was slow and is still far
from complete. Third, the focus on the period 1951-1991 is of the greatest interest for growth and
development economists. In 1951 Italian per capita income was only one third of the U.S. per
capita income and the country was still largely rural and agriculture based. Forty years later Italy
was fully industrialized and with an expanding service sector, after having increased its per capita
income almost ﬁve fold to reach 75% of the U.S. level. This period can be genuinely considered as
the phase of economic take-oﬀ for Italy, during which it joined the ”club” of developed nations.
We analyze the diﬀerential development across provinces during a period of fast industrializa-
tion. Agglomeration economies (determined by existing urbanization and specialization) as well as
local social variables justify the existence in the long-run of diﬀerences in labor productivity across
provinces. Market potential, input-output linkages and local conditions generate diﬀerent agglom-
eration economies in diﬀerent locations and attract factors (mostly capital and entrepreneurship)
generating dense areas with concentration of ﬁrms and peripheral regions, with much fewer ﬁrms.
In our study we focus on employment and its growth (rather than productivity) as done in previous
studies of local agglomeration economies and their determinants within the U.S. (such as Gleaser et
al.[12] and Henderson et al. [18] ). We argue that in Italy diﬀerential productivity across provinces
produced diﬀerences of labor demand across regions, while a common institutional set-up provided
similar labor supply conditions (wage-setting procedures). The resulting equilibrium would feature
diﬀerent employment rates across provinces: high-productivity provinces have higher employment
rates in equilibrium. We illustrate the main features of such mechanism in a stylized model in
section 2. A second important reason to focus on employment is that low employment rates, due
to a combination of low participation and high unemployment rates, are probably one of the main
concerns of continental European economies. Vis a vis the United Kingdom and the United States,
European countries have very low employment rates. While taxation is often blamed for this dis-
3tortion, depressed labor demand and low mobility of people could be a key factor in contributing
to the phenomenon or at least to its regional aspect. A look at cross-province diﬀerences will make
clear that local factors may have a lot to do with labor demand and employment rates. Finally, and
perhaps most crucially, employment is regarded as a key variable across regions. It is a widespread
perception in Europe among policy makers and economists, that while it would be possible from
an economic point of view, to improve the conditions of poorer regions either by pushing people
to leave or by ﬁnancing their unemployment and low participation (posting the bill to richer re-
gions), both measures would generate strong strains on the society and would damage the cohesion
between poor and rich regions. Social costs of low employment rates, of migrations and of taxing
some regions to support others are probably larger than the pure economic costs. European policy
makers accept the view that no way to development of poor regions exists other than promoting
some degree of agglomeration economies to attract private capital and entrepreneurship and to gen-
erate ﬁrms and employment growth. The set up of the ”structural” funds to help develop poorer
regions within the European Union embodies this view. Understanding what economic and social
factors aﬀect the process of regional industrialization is therefore a very important task.
We focus on two social characteristics in order to analyze their impact on employment growth.
They are the degree of civic involvement of citizens and the presence of violent crime. These two
variables may aﬀect labor productivity through their impact on capital accumulation and on local
knowledge diﬀusion. While their choice is somewhat guided by the Italian case we believe that they
are key social variables, rarely analyzed in their regional impact on development and very interesting
also beyond the boundaries of our case-study. Moreover, as we consider the impact of these variables
on development within the same country we isolate their ”direct” eﬀect from the eﬀe c tt h a tt h e ym a y
have on economic development due to their impact on institutional arrangements and on political
systems and their stability. Several recent cross-country analyses have included these variables
as determinants of development (Knack and Keefer, [21], Coleman [7], Temple and Johnson [36]).
However, at the country level, it is hard to distinguish their direct impact from the impact through
institutions that these social variables contributed to shape. Our question in this paper is: could
these social variables have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity and employment growth also within
an identical institutional arrangement? The answer may shed light on the complex relation between
economic factors, institutional factors and social factors in which each one has an important and
4separate role in promoting economic development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a stylized labor-market model
that illustrates the mechanism determining the employment rate and, in transition, employment
growth. Section 3 discusses the social variables and the channels through which they may aﬀect
economic performance with speciﬁc reference to agglomeration economies and capital accumula-
tion. Section 4 presents some preliminary evidence on correlations between employment rates and
economic and social characteristics. Section 5 performs the econometric analysis of industrial ag-
glomerations and their determinants for Italian provinces 1951-1991 with a particular focus on the
impact of the social variables. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e F r a m e w o r k
2.1 Labor Demand and Wage-Setting Equation
In this section we present a simple model that justiﬁes the key long-run relationship between
employment rates and productivity levels in an economy whose labor markets have the features
typical of the Italian regional markets during the period 1951-1991. The labor market in Italy was
rather segmented at the regional and local level as people were not very mobile (especially after
the seventies). Small and medium ﬁrms accounted for most of the labor demand and some form of
organized wage bargaining describes the conditions of labor supply better than perfect competition
across workers. In the rest of the paper we argue that diﬀerent social and economic characteristics
aﬀect the long run level of labor productivity of ﬁrms through capital accumulation and local
agglomeration economies. The model presented in this section shows how, in this environment,
diﬀerences in labor productivity generate diﬀerences in employment rates rather than (or as well
as) diﬀerences in wages. This result carries to relative growth rates of employment in transition
towards the balanced growth path once we control for initial employment rates.
Let us assume that in order to produce a homogenous, perfectly tradable good, Yi, the represen-
tative ﬁrm in province i employs labor Li,c a p i t a lKi and a ﬁxed factor Ti and enjoys a level of total
factor productivity Ai.A ﬁrst channel for social variable to aﬀect economic outcome is through
their eﬀect on local agglomeration externalities and local TFP. We can consider Ai = A(Si)w h e r e







The share α of produced income goes to compensate the ﬁxed factor, the share β compensates
capital and the remaining (1 − α − β) share goes to compensate labor. The production sector is
in perfect competition, and ﬁrms equate wages to marginal productivity of labor, deﬁning a labor
demand curve. Physical capital is assumed to be mobile across regions so that in equilibrium net
returns to capital are also equated across provinces. A second channel through which local social
variables may matter is in determining the return to physical capital. We may think that in regions
with low social capital or high crime some resources need to be spent (wasted) to appropriate the
returns of investments. These resources may be needed to avoid diversion or simply to ensure the
enforcement of the contract. Guiso et al. [16] show that social capital resulting in ”trust” makes
ﬁnancial transactions more widespread and less costly. This would act as a tax τ(Si)o nr e t u r n
to capital which is higher for regions with poor civic spirit and high crime rate. Free mobility of
capital implies:






We assume that the population in working age in province i, Ni,i sﬁxed and not mobile so
that ﬁrms hire within such pool and Li ≤ Ni. This assumptions captures a feature of the Italian
economy during the period 1951-1991: the mobility of population across provinces was rather small
and closer to no mobility than to perfect mobility. Looking at the available statistics on inter-
regional migration in Italy for the period 1971-1991, for which data are available, we compute that
on average only 3% of the population moved across regions within a decade. This is dramatically
lower than, say, for the U.S., where inter-state migration in a decade is closer to 20% of the
population1.W ed e n o t ew i t hei = Li/Ni the employment rate (between 0 and 1), ki = Ki/Ni is
capital per person and with ti = Ti/Ni the amount of ﬁxed-factor per person. Using this notation
the labor demand, obtained by equating wage to marginal productivity of labor, once we solve out
for the capital stock, can be written as:
1Author’s calculations on Eurostat ”Regio” data and U.S. Census Data.


















i ,w h e r eΦ is
an unimportant constant, as ”productivity net of crowding eﬀects”. This term depends on social
capital Si in a positive way, both through the positive eﬀect of civic interactions on local TFP
A(Si) and through the negative eﬀect of social variables on τ(Si).We can think of social factors
and urbanization and agglomeration economies as aﬀecting positively the term ai,o n c ew ec o n t r o l
for the crowding (density) eﬀects of ti.
On the supply side, rather than modeling the choice of competitive agents we describe the
behavior of workers as deﬁned by a wage-setting relation. We specify a very general wage-setting
function, just as in Blanchard [4] Chapter 6, to capture the idea that, either because of unionized
bargaining or because of search frictions, workers have more bargaining power when the employ-
ment rate ei is high (tight labor market). This is due to the fact that, when the labor market is
tight, workers have several outside options as they can be hired elsewhere, while ﬁrms have little
alternatives, as few potential workers are available. This shifts bargaining power in favor of workers
and allows them to ask for higher real wages. The only diﬀerence with standard models of bargain-
ing is that we consider employment rates (rather than unemployment rates) as the relevant variable
in determining bargaining power of workers. This seems reasonable as the diﬀerence between people
unemployed and people out of the labor force is often rather feeble. For a good perspective of job
and salary many people would enter the labor force. Moreover, ﬂows into or out of employment are
almost equally distributed between the pools of ”unemployed” and pool of people ”out of Labor
Force”2. Therefore we only distinguish between employed (L) and non-employed (N − L). Firms
in the long run consider the total population in working age N as the potential pool from which






2Blanchard reports that in the U.S. during the period 1994-2000 the ﬂows into (out of) employment from (to)
unemployment were 1.8 (1.5) million per year. Similarly the ﬂows
into (out of) employment from (and to) ”out of the labor force” were 1.5 (1.7) million per year.
7The real wage requested by the workers is a positive function of the employment rate ei which
captures the labor market conditions and a positive function of a catch-all variable z that captures
the features of the labor market institutions increasing the bargaining power of workers (such as
minimum wage, unemployment subsidies or union power). Importantly the institutional variable z
is common to all provinces as they share laws, institutions and labor organizations.
If we consider the overall national market, indicating with a subscript N the variables relative
to national averages, the equilibrium is achieved where the labor demand crosses the wage-setting




N = F(eN,z)( 5 )
In expression (5) aN is the average national productivity net of crowding and eN is the average
national employment rate. Taking logs on both sides and taking a log-linear approximation of
function F we can write the equilibrium condition isolating the endogenous variable eN on the left
hand side:
lne∗
N = b −
γ(1 − β)
α + δ(1 − β)
lnz +
1 − β
α + δ(1 − β)
lnaN (6)
e∗
N is the average national employment rate in equilibrium. b is an unimportant constant, γ
is the positive elasticity of function F to the variable z (∂F
∂z
z
F )a n dδ is the positive elasticity of




2.2 Local Employment Rates
The equilibrium in the national market is illustrated in the right ﬁgure of Panel 1, labeled ”National
Average”. The equilibrium wage (w∗
N) and employment rate (e∗
N) are determined where the Labor
Demand and the Wage-setting curves cross. On the horizontal axis, which measures employment
rate, we have also reported the upper bound for e∗
N that is one. The distance between the point
e∗
N and the upper bound is the ”non-employment rate”. The national market is, however, the
aggregate (average) of several provincial markets. In particular there are some provinces with high
productivity (higher than average) and some with low productivity (lower than average). Their
8labor demand and wage setting curves are illustrated in the left and center ﬁgures of Panel 1,
labelled ”Low Productivity Province” and ”High Productivity Province” respectively. Notice that
while the Labor demand curves are province-speciﬁc because productivity, net of crowding eﬀects,
varies from province to province, the wage setting curve reported is the same in each region because
the parameter z, capturing institutional features, is a national parameter.
Two diﬀerent equilibria are reported in Panel 1 for the provincial markets. We illustrate both
and show that both of them imply larger employment rates in provinces with larger productivity.
The ﬁrst case is that of a ”centralized bargaining” equilibrium and the second is a ”de-centralized
bargaining” equilibrium. In the centralized bargaining set-up workers, organized in unions, bargain
collectively for their wages by looking at the aggregate national labor market. Considering the
average national employment rate, eN, workers and ﬁrms choose the real wage w∗
N compatible
with the wage-setting behavior and with the aggregate labor demand. Once they set such wage,
the workers organizations impose it to all the local markets. Given diﬀerent labor demand across
provinces such common wage w∗
N implies that high-productivity provinces (central ﬁgure) employ
more workers achieving employment rate ec
H and low productivity provinces (left ﬁgure) employ less
workers and achieve employment rate ec
L . The superscript c denotes the ”centralized” equilibrium.
In this case, at the province level, the equilibrium does not lie on the wage-setting curve. This is
because local workers do not consider local labor market conditions (ei) when bargaining for their
wages, but they adopt the centralized wage, based on national conditions (eN). Centralized wage
setting was the prevalent institutional arrangement for manufacturing workers in Italy since the
sixties up to the late eighties due to strong union organizations.
Alternatively, and this was the case in the ﬁfties and again in the recent years, we can think
that workers engage in decentralized bargaining with ﬁrms at the province level. This allows them
to react to local market conditions (ei) , but we still assume that the ”rules” or the ”frame”
of the bargaining (captured by z) is common because dictated by national laws and practices.
In this case we can assume that workers and ﬁrms achieve local agreements, responsive of local
conditions and the wage and employment rate in equilibrium are given by the intersection of the
wage-setting curve (identical in shape across provinces) and the province-speciﬁc labor demand
curve. Employment rates in equilibrium are ed
H and ed
L in the high and low productivity province,
respectively. Equilibrium wages, now also diﬀer across regions, and are wd
H and wd
L. Importantly,
9in both types of equilibrium, there is a positive association between provincial productivity and
provincial employment rate. Formally, the equilibrium employment rate in province i (= H,L)i n





α + δ(1 − β)
lnai(Si)( 7 )
where φ1
N is a term that depends only on national variables (z) and constant parameters









N is a term that depends only on national variables (z and aN in this case) and constant
terms (α,β,γ,δ). The above relationships determine the equilibrium employment rates as a function
of the equilibrium productivity in provinces. If relative productivity, ai,i nt h el o n gr u nr e a c h e sa n d
moves around its balanced growth path level, employment rates would reach its steady state too.
Therefore, controlling for the initial employment rate the growth rate of employment in a province is
positively dependent on the balanced growth path level of productivity. As population growth was
rather homogeneous across provinces and not correlated with employment growth (0.07 correlation
coeﬃcient for the 1950-1990 period) we can approximate the growth rate of the employment rate
with the growth rate of employment plus an error term εit. We assume that during the transition
towards the balanced growth path, which took place after world war II, employment grew faster
for provinces starting farther from their balanced growth path (BGP). Therefore this growth rate
would depend negatively on initial employment rate ei,t and positively on the BGP employment rate
determined by (7) or (8). Qualitatively the dependence of employment growth on Social variables






We estimate a linear speciﬁcation of equation (9) including as dependent variables the initial
employment rates and including some social variables to capture Si and some variables to capture
10important characteristics of industrial specialization, industrial competition and diversity which
may also aﬀect industrial productivity ai.
3 Social Variables and Productivity
3.1 Civic Involvement
The idea of ”civic involvement” as vehicle of agglomeration economies and enhancer of local pro-
ductivity follows the original contribution by Robert Putnam [32] who ﬁrst identiﬁed, measured
and studied the impact of civic involvement (often called ”social capital” by the author ) on re-
gional institutions in Italy. Later, in a shorter paper (Helliwell and Putnam [17] ) the eﬀect of civic
involvement on regional per capita income was tested. Abundant qualitative literature relative to
the economic success of industrial districts in northern and central Italy has also analyzed concepts
of social cooperation, social networks and local characteristics (see for instance Brusco [6], Leonardi
and Nanetti [26], [25]). More recently Forni and Paba [10] have analyzed the eﬀect of industrial
and social variables on productivity growth in Italian provinces, ﬁnding an important role of some
of them such as labor conﬂict and electoral participation. The social variables analyzed are often
closely related to the idea of civic spirit deﬁned in Putnam [32]. In particular involvement in local
organizations, participation in networks and in general the degree of”trust” among citizens may
aﬀect labor productivity through two channels. First, decreasing the uncertainty of economic trans-
actions by increasing reciprocal communication and trust among agents may increase the returns to
i n v e s t m e n t s .T h i sw o u l da c t ,i nt h em o d e lp r e s e n t e da b o v e ,t h r o u g har e d u c t i o no ft h et e r mτ(Si)
which is a unit cost of appropriating returns from investment in a world with diversion or imperfect
enforcement of contracts. This is the channel emphasized in the recent analysis of Guiso et al. [16]
that focuses on social capital and ﬁnancial markets in Italy. Second, it may increase the provision
of local public goods and facilitate the learning interactions outside the natural units of produc-
tions (ﬁrms) inducing urbanization externalities which are external to the ﬁrm but internal to the
industrial agglomeration. In particular Marshallian externalities from ”local knowledge spillovers”
could be made stronger when agents interact frequently in a trusting local environment. This
eﬀect would act through an increase in the term A(Si) in the model presented above. Becattini
[3] and other scholars analyzing the Italian industrial districts have often emphasized the presence
11of these local networks (i.e. of local civic involvement) together with homogenous specialization
and local competition as determinants of the industrial success of some of these districts. We do
not explicitly observe through which channel the social variables operate but we analyze their ﬁnal
impact on employment creation.
Existing studies have analyzed the impact of civic involvement, or of the somewhat more general
idea of ”trust” among citizens, on productivity and growth across countries (Knack and Keefer
[21]). Here we test whether local labor productivity and urbanization externalities depend on the
intensity of civic involvement. While the variables used to measure civic involvement are similar to
those proposed by Putnam we believe that civic involvement is a much more local and diversiﬁed
phenomenon in Italy than it emerges from the analysis of twenty regions (as done in Putnam [32]).
There are strong (historically determined) local identities, often centered in cities, rather than
in regions, and the extent of interactions and civic involvement is probably better captured by
using provinces, rather than regions, as units. Therefore, we use 95 provinces, corresponding (most
of them) to one main city and its surroundings, possibly inclusive of other smaller towns. This
choice allows a much richer characterization and much larger variance of social variables as well as
stronger statistical power to identify partial correlations. Three main variables are used to identify
civic involvement and all of them have been collected going back to the sources of Putnam’s data
(method and sources for these as well as for all data are described in the Appendix). First, we
measure the density of associations relative to the population (i.e. the number of associations per
1,000 inhabitants) as counted by a census of all Italian associations performed in the early eighties.
This variable (AssDens) captures the propensity of citizens to gather in recreational, cultural,
artistic, sport, environmental and any other kind of non-proﬁt association. Second we measure
the electoral turnout in the referendum elections of 1974 (Turnout74). The referendum held in
1974, that decided about legalization of divorce, was a heated topic of contention and socially
minded citizens were extremely concerned about its social consequences. Local organization and
networks were mobilized and responded so that turnout in the referendum was a measure of social
involvement of people. We collect from the reports of that referendum the data on the percentage
turnout in each province. Finally the reading of newspapers, both local and national, as a way to be
informed on local and general issues is regarded by Putnam as another potential indicator of civic
involvement. We use the share of citizen reading non-sport newspapers for year 1974 (Newspaper),
12the earliest year for which we could ﬁnd these data, as a measure of intensity of newspaper reading
in the community. While each of the three indicators is probably an imperfect proxy for the
unobservable variable ”Civic Involvement” we combine the three into an index (CIVIC)t h a t
should parsimoniously capture most of the covariance of these proxies.
3.2 Violent Crime
Economists have studied crime, its determinants and its consequences since the early work of Gary
Becker [5]. Most of the empirical work has focused, however, on the economic determinants of crime,
(see Gould et al. [14], Grogger [15], Lochner and Moretti [27], Machin and Meghir [28]) rather than
on its economic consequences. The direct cost of some form of crime, such as murder, is so high
that there would be plenty of policy reasons to be concerned with it even lacking any other negative
externality of crime. There is little work, therefore, on the aggregate consequences of violent crime
on economic development and growth. From the theoretical point of view recent models argue that
the decision of committing crimes or engaging in productive activity are simultaneous (Murphy et
al. [30], Sah [34]). In particular the presence of many criminals introduces a negative externality on
people who produce (as they are more easily victimized) and a positive externality on people who
commit crimes (as they are less likely to be caught). This mechanism may induce multiple equilibria
in which economies with similar fundamentals end up with very diﬀerent levels of crime. In this
context it does not make sense to ask whether criminal activity aﬀects or is aﬀected by crime, as
the two are simultaneously determined. This explanation is often invoked in order to account for
the large variations of crime rates over time and across space (mainly in the U.S.) vis a vis similar
economic conditions. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [13] claim that the major determinant of
the large variation in crime rates over space in the U.S. are the local social interactions which act to
reinforce each other’s behavior. However, such simultaneity and self-reinforcement is stronger for
petty crime and much weaker for murder. We will argue that in Italy murder rates across provinces
have been rather stable over time and along diﬀerent stages of development. Murders have been
the expression of organized crime with tendency to operate in speciﬁc areas and not the expression
of occasional criminal activity ﬂu c t u a t i n gi nt i m ea n ds p a c ew i t he c o n o m i cc o n d i t i o n s .I nt r y i n gt o
convince the reader of an eﬀect from murder rates to economic activity, we will use the temporal
dimension and check the correlation between crime rates in the far past and subsequent long run
13growth.
At the country-level violent crime has been analyzed in the form of social unrest, political as-
sassinations and frequency of ”coup d’etat” across countries, as determinant of political instability
and, through that channel, as a hurdle to economic growth (Barro [2], Mauro [29]). Several violent
phenomena, however, conducive to crimes and murders with potentially major disruptive conse-
quences on economic activity, are neither at the individual level nor at the national level. The
Basque Countries within Spain, Corse within France, Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom and
some provinces of the Italian Mezzogiorno are but a few examples of regions where violent crime
stems from diverse causes (ethnic identity, religious divides, organized criminal activity) and has a
clear regional or provincial connotation. Some of the roots of the phenomena of civic involvement
and violent crime could be common. Lederman et al. [24], for instance, show that ”social capital”
is one important determinant of murder rates across countries. Ethnic fragmentation may lead to
low civic involvement and more crime, or the presence of ”positive” civic organization can keep
the crime level under check. The two phenomena, however, might be somewhat correlated but are
well distinct. Lack of trust does not normally degenerate into criminal violence. On the other hand
phenomena such as terrorism or well organized criminal groups (Maﬁa, drug lords) may generate
violent crime in regions where civic involvement of the average citizen is high.
We focus only on the most extreme form of violent crime, namely the murder rate per 10,000
inhabitants captured by the variable Murder. We believe this is an interesting measure that
captures the maximally disruptive aspect of violent crime on economic activity and, in Italy, murder
rates have been associated to the presence of established criminal organizations. We use historical
data to measure the murder rates in 1991, 1971 and, at the regional level, in 1951. The correlation
coeﬃcients of murder rates across decades are very high (0.6 between 1990 and 1970 and 0.72
between 1950 and 1970) and some provinces such as Palermo, Caltanissetta in Sicily and Napoli,
Reggio Calabria in the South are consistently among those with highest murder rates. Also the
variation of murder rates across provinces is large. Many provinces experienced less than one
murder per million of inhabitants and others had more than 20 murders per million. However,
some economic variables (such as employment rates) also exhibit large variations across provinces.
A second reason to focus on Murder rates is that it is very unlikely to under-report murders as,
once the ”violent” cause of death is ascertained, the Judiciary authority is automatically notiﬁed.
14This avoids the problem of under-reporting of crime in areas where people have low trust in Police
forces or in less developed areas. In a recent study Soares [35], comparing victimization surveys
and oﬃcial statistics, ﬁnds that the extent of under-reporting for crimes such as thefts, burglaries
and assault crimes in less developed countries is up to ten times larger than in more developed
ones. He ﬁnds, though, that this is not true for homicides. While it would be interesting to look at
statistics on petty crime, thefts, larceny or robbery across Italian provinces their under-reporting
would severely bias any conclusion. A third reason to think that murder rate has a maximal
negative external eﬀect on economic activity is that murders are known through national reports in
the whole country and entrepreneurs and investors are well informed on them and tend to associate
high murder areas with high uncertainty and additional costs for security. This is likely to produce
disincentives and centrifugal forces pushing factors and enterprises out of these regions.
4 Preliminary Evidence: Employment Rates in the Private Sector
To prepare the ground to the analysis of social variables and economic performance for Italian
Provinces, we present here some stylized facts and correlations. This section is meant to convince
the reader that there are some relevant correlations in the data and these correlations survive when
we control for some of the variables which could aﬀect both social and economic performances.
We also make some attempts to inquire into the direction of causation by using long lags of inde-
pendent variables. We begin by considering a cross-sectional analysis as it gives us an idea of the
dramatic economic diﬀerences across Italian provinces, still present in 1991. Over the decades the
intervention of the central Italian government in trying to stimulate local development has often
taken the form of promoting public employment in poor areas, subsidizing income and equating
wages between rich and poorer areas. For this reason and following our stylized model in Section
2, rather than measuring average income it is interesting, and closer to a measure of the strength
o ft h el o c a lp r i v a t ee c o n o m y ,t om e a s u r et h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o r .E m p l o y m e n t
rates and their growth rates are highly correlated to other measures of economic development such
as income per capita (see, for instance Forni and Paba [10]). We consider all employees working
in the industry and service sectors, excluding public employees (i.e. those working for the Public
Administration, the Education Sector and the Health Care Sector, which were completely public
15during the considered period) and we express them as percentage of working age population (age
16-64) in each province. Higher employment rates in the private sector reveal stronger private labor
demand in the province and, indirectly, stronger agglomeration externalities. Figure 1 plots the
employment rate in the private sector against the murder rate (Murders per 10,000 inhabitants)
for the 95 Italian provinces in year 1991.
Each province is denoted with an identiﬁer which could take the values ”SO”, ”CE”, ”NE” or
”NW” depending on the location of the province in the South, Center, North East or North-West
of the country, respectively. Three facts are clear from the ﬁgure. First a negative and signiﬁcant
correlation between murder rates and employment rates exists and is statistically signiﬁcant and
quantitatively large. The OLS regression line, reported in Figure 1 has a coeﬃcient equal to -1.5
(t-statistic 3.81) and explains 18% of the variance of the employment rate. A decrease in the
murder rate of 0.1 is associated to an increase in participation rate of 0.15 (15%). Second, it
appears that the association between murder rates and employment rates is non-linear. While for
low levels of the murder rate (say below 0.5 murders per 10,000 people) there is a large range of
possible employment rates, high murder rates (above 0.5) are systematically associated with low
employment rates (below average). It is reasonable to think that murder rates above a certain
threshold are very harmful to private economic activity, while small diﬀerences at low rates do not
really aﬀect economic incentives. Finally, looking at the provincial identiﬁers, we realize that there
is a large variation even within each of the four large areas in crime rate and economic performance.
Some of the provinces exhibit private employment rates as high as 80%, which is remarkable also
for U.S. standard, while others agonize at levels of 20-30%, which is very low even for European
Standards. On the other hand, while most of the high-crime provinces are in the South, there
are some of them in the North-West as well and there are several southern provinces with low
crime-rates. This variation of crime-rates across Italian provinces, including within a geographic
area, will be very useful to identify the impact of violent crime on employment at the provincial
level.
It is also useful to produce a scatterplot, similar to Figure 1, for the second variable of inter-
est, namely the degree of civic involvement. To do so, we combine the three variables described
in Section 3, namely the participation rate at the 1974 referendum (Turnout74), the density of
association per 1,000 inhabitants (AssDens) and the percentage of people reading newspapers
16(Newspaper) into one variable. This variable is the ﬁrst principal component of the three mea-
sures. It is the linear combination that explains the largest share of common variance of the three
variables. The three variables are highly correlated. The correlation coeﬃcient between Turnout74
and Newspaper is equal to 0.75, while AssDens has a correlations coeﬃcient of about 0.4 with
either of the other two variables. The civic engagement variable (CIVIC) is therefore deﬁned as:
CIVIC =0 .89(Turnout74) + 0.88(Newspaper)+0 .63(AssDens)( 1 0 )
The variable CIVIC explains 44% of the variance of AssDens, 65% of the variance of
Newspaper and 70% of the variance of Turnout74. Figure 2 reports the scatterplot of private
employment rate against the index CIVIC, together with the linear regression line between them.
The positive relation between the two variables is statistically signiﬁcant, quantitatively relevant
and tighter than in the case of the Murder rate. The index CIVIC explains almost 50% of the vari-
ation of the private employment rate, and the t-statistic on the OLS coeﬃcient is as large as 8.78.
However, it is clear already from a ﬁrst glance, that most of the correlation is due to the fact that
all southern provinces (denoted with ”SO”) have low values of CIVIC (and of employment rates)
relative to all other provinces. There is not much correlation between CIVIC and employment
rate within the Southern group and within the group of all other regions taken one at a time.
Moving beyond the raw correlations, we present in Table 1 some regression results to convince
the reader that the correlation between social variables, particularly between murder rates, and
employment rates is robust to the inclusion of several other controls. Column 1 of Table 1 shows the
OLS regression of Employment rate on Murder and CIVIC. While the two explanatory variables
are correlated with each other (-0.41 is their correlation coeﬃcient), conﬁrming that some of their
causes may be common, each has a signiﬁcant and large impact on the employment rate and
together they explain about half of its variation. An increase by one standard deviation of CIVIC is
associated with a 7 percentage points increase in the employment rate. An increase of one standard
deviation of Murder is associated with a decrease by 3 percentage points of the employment rate.
The inclusion of measures of Human Capital (Column 2) in the form of the share of population
with a secondary school degree (Secondary)o rw i t ha nh i g h e re d u c a t i o nd e g r e e( Tertiary)d o e s
not aﬀect the partial correlation of the Social Variables with employment rates. These measures
17of human capital are positively related to employment rates. However only the share of college
graduates (tertiary education) is signiﬁcant in its positive eﬀect on employment. The inclusion
of geographical dummies, however, for North-East, North-West and Center (leaving out South)
decreases signiﬁcantly the impact of social variables. In particular CIVIC is only signiﬁcant at the
10% level (Column 3), while Murder is still signiﬁcant at the 5%. To conﬁrm that the impact of
social variables is not simply an eﬀect identiﬁed by the contrast between the north and the south
of the country in Column 4 we run the regression limiting the data to the 29 southern provinces.
Interestingly, the size and signiﬁcance of the social variables is similar to those estimated in Column
3.
While the index CIVIC could be a convenient way of summarizing the information from imper-
fect measures of the civic involvement of citizens, it is useful to include the three variables separately
in the regression in order to see which one is mostly correlated with employment rates. Column
5 disentangles the contribution of the CIVIC index by including separately each of the variables
Turnout74, AssDens and Newspaper. The regression reveals that only the variable Turnout74
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated to employment rates. The low signiﬁcance of the coef-
ﬁcients on the other two variables, especially for the Association Density, casts some doubts on
our understanding and measuring of Civic involvement and, possibly, of its impact on economic
performance.
Finally we address preliminarily in column 6 to 8 the issue of reverse causation between Murder
and Employment rates as economic development reduces crime and, possibly, murder rates. While
we would need some exogenous variation of murder rates in order to address properly the issue,
the best we can do here is to rely on the idea that past variables are predetermined with respect to
later ones so that if we can measure murder rates in the distant past for Italian provinces this could
help as a ”more exogenous” instrument for contemporary murder rates. From Italian historical
statistics on crime we are able to measure murder rates in provinces in year 1971 (Murder71) and
also murder rates in Regions (rather than provinces) in 1951 (Murder51). We use Murder71 as
instrument for Murder in column 6 and we use Murder51 as instrument in Column 7. The two
variables are good instruments, explaining about 35% of the variation of Murder and the estimates,
while rather imprecise, do not show any evidence of an endogeneity bias towards 0 of OLS. If
anything the instrumental variables estimates are larger in absolute value than the OLS ones. In
18column 7 we cluster the errors by region, as the instrument varies only across regions. Column
8 shows that, using Murder51 as instruments, we can identify a very important role for violent
crime even when we restrict the analysis to the southern provinces only. All in all, acknowledging
the limits of cross-sectional regressions, we think that we identiﬁed a robust partial correlation
between murder rates and employment rates. Such correlation does not seem to be fully driven by
t h ei m p a c to fe c o n o m i ca c t i v i t yo nc r i m ea n dm a yi n d i c a t ear e l e v a n te ﬀect from crime rates to
economic development and agglomerations. We set to analyze this issue further in the next section.
5 Local Characteristics and Employment Growth
Large part of the economic success, or lack of it, of an Italian province in 1991 was accounted
for by the development (or lack of it) occurred in the post Second World War period. In partic-
ular, industrial and in general economic take oﬀ depended on the presence of a dynamic core of
agglomeration in the province, attracting ﬁrms and generating employment growth. It is therefore
very instructive to study the emergence of industrial agglomerations during the 1951-1991 period,
focussing mainly on footloose industries, i.e. the manufacturing sector, and on the economic and
social determinants of these agglomeration forces. Italy was a rather underdeveloped country in
1951 and its economic growth took the form of industrial development, at ﬁrst, becoming mainly
growth of the service sector only much later. Large industrial agglomerations (such as the car
industry in Turin or shipbuilding in Genoa) served as focal points of economic development in the
ﬁfties and sixties while smaller industrial clusters (such as the industrial districts in the Center
and North-East) continued to provide economic stimulus in the seventies and eighties. Focussing
on agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector is therefore particularly interesting and
appropriate in order to understand economic development in post-war Italy.
Our empirical framework, justiﬁed by the model in section 2 is similar to the one adopted by
other authors who have analyzed agglomeration economies in cities or regions and their eﬀect on
employment growth. Following Glaeser et al [12], Henderson et al. [18], and other authors (reviewed
in Rosenthal and Strange [33]) we estimate the following equation, using a sector in a province as
the unit of observation:
19ln(Lpit/Lpi0)=Di +l n ( Lp0)+Concpi0 + Divpi0 + Comppi0 + Socialp0 + εpi (11)
The dependent variable is the growth rate of private employment L in sector i, province p
b e t w e e np e r i o d0( = 1 9 5 1 )a n dt (=1991). Our data on employment are from the Italian Census
of Manufacturing and Services which takes place every ten years. The manufacturing industries
for which we can reconstruct comparable data between 1951 and 1991 are ﬁf t e e n( l i s t e di nt h e
Appendix) and the provinces are 95 so that we have 1,425 potential observations in our cross-
sectional growth regression. However, as very small sectors could have an erratic behavior and
their growth rates could be very noisy, we only include those industries which accounted for at
least 1% of the manufacturing employment of the province in 1951 leaving only 921 observations.
Due to strong centralized wage setting for each sector we assume that the wage growth within
each sector has been equal for all provinces so that Di, the sector ﬁxed eﬀect, captures change in
employment due to change in wages. Lp0 is the total manufacturing employment in province p in
1951. It controls for all the eﬀects related to the overall size of the province. It could be positive
because of local demand eﬀect or negative due to congestion and mean reversion of employment
density across provinces. We include this term, following Combes [8], so that the coeﬃcient on
the variable Concpi0, w h i c hm e a s u r e st h er e l a t i v ec o n c e n t r a t i o no fs e c t o ri in province p (Lpi0/
Lp0), identiﬁes the strength of the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities, net of within sector
congestion eﬀects. A positive eﬀe c to ft h ec o n c e n t r a t i o nv a r i a b l ei sas i g nt h a tt h eg r o w t ho fas e c t o r
beneﬁts from its initial relative size, implying that learning externalities within the sector encourage
growth. A negative sign implies that sector congestion eﬀects outweigh MAR externalities. Divpi0
is an index of diversity in the manufacturing sector. It is calculated as 1 −
P
j6=i(shjp0)2, where
shjp0 is the share of manufacturing workers of province p employed in sector j.T h e i n d e x i s
sometimes called ”index of fractionalization” and it measures, for each sector i and province p,
how ”diverse” the sector composition of the rest of the manufacturing in the province is. Its value
is bounded between 0 and 1 and higher values correspond to higher diversity. Diversity of the
manufacturing composition may promote urbanization externalities, due to beneﬁcial interactions
among industries. The eﬀects of diversity on productivity are often called ”Jacobs Externality”
since Jane Jacobs [19], [20] identiﬁed the crucial role of diversity and of cross-fertilization of ideas
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the initial degree of local competition among ﬁrms of industry i in province p.I ti sm e a s u r e da st h e
inverse of the average employment in a ﬁrm in province p relative to the average employment in a
ﬁr ma tt h en a t i o n a ll e v e lf o rt h a ts e c t o r :t h es m a l l e rt h ea v e r a g eﬁrm in a province, relative to the
national average, the larger the competition in the sector within that province. Local competition
could be a strong promoter of product and process innovation and therefore another important
source of agglomeration externalities. The work of Porter [31] has developed, through several case-
studies, the idea that local competition generates higher intensity of innovation and technological
spillovers in the local industry. The inclusion of such variable follows Glaeser et al. [12] who ﬁrst
tested the importance of this competition-eﬀect on city growth. The summary statistics for the
variables deﬁned above can be found in Table A1 of the Data Appendix.
Finally Socialp0 are the measures of the two social variables described above, Murder and
CIVIC. They vary across provinces and we can identify their eﬀect on agglomeration economies,
for the average sector in each province. While ideally we would measure these variables at the
beginning of the period (1951) data availability forces us to use indices calculated for the seventies.
For the Murder rate we use the regional value in 1951 as instrument in one speciﬁcation. We also
rely on the fact that the structure of the regression, the inclusion of sector and regional controls
and the stability of the social variables over time, reduce the potential endogeneity problems.
5.1 Eﬀects of Diversity, Competition and Concentration
We implement empirically regression (11) and we report the results in Table 2 and Table 3. We
ﬁrst present the results including only the economic variables as determinant of agglomerations
and growth. Table 2 reports this speciﬁcation that omits the social variables so that we can
compare some of the results to those in the previous literature which has focussed on various
kinds of agglomeration externalities. Next section and Table 3 present the evidence when we
include the social variables which are the focus of our analysis. The dependent variable is the
yearly growth rate of employment for the province-sector. We can interpret the magnitude of
the coeﬃcients as the eﬀect of the independent variable on the yearly percentage growth rate of
employment. Column 1 does not include either sector or regional dummies, but only the measures
of Concentration, Diversity and Competition. Column 2 includes ﬁfteen sector dummies. Column
213 adds the share of manufacturing in total employment of the province as regressor, in order to
separate the eﬀect of pure crowding from the eﬀect of manufacturing concentration. Finally Column
4 adds nineteen regional dummies, controlling for any regional diﬀerence in employment growth and
allowing identiﬁcation of the agglomeration eﬀects only using within region, within sector (across
provinces) variation. Column 4 is certainly the preferred speciﬁcation as it controls for any sector-
speciﬁc factor (such as wage growth) and any region-speciﬁc factor (such as provision of public
infrastructure, or distance from large European markets). The estimated eﬀects are, however, rather
stable and precise across speciﬁcations. First of all the positive eﬀect of sectorial Diversity and local
competition (Div and Compet) is statistically signiﬁcant and large in each speciﬁcation. Increasing
the degree of local competition by one standard deviation (1.8) increases employment growth in the
provincial sector by 0.66 percentage points per year. Increasing the diversity of the manufacturing
sector by one standard deviation (0.11), increases employment growth by 0.52 percentage points
per year. Keeping in mind that the average growth rate of employment in the considered industries
was around 0.5 percentage points per year in the period 1951-1991 we have very large eﬀects from
competition and diversity. Our estimates of these two eﬀects are very consistent with the ﬁndings
of Glaeser et al. [12] relative to American city-industries. They ﬁnd positive eﬀect of competition
and of diversity on growth of employment 1956-1987. A positive eﬀect of diversity on employment
growth was also found by Henderson et al. [18] for high tech city-industries in the U.S. As for the
presence of MAR externalities, the eﬀect of initial concentration of employment in a sector (Conc)
on the following growth is consistently negative. Increasing the initial concentration of a sector
has a negative eﬀect on following growth, revealing that crowding eﬀects are stronger than MAR
externalities. For a given relative concentration of the sector, increasing the overall size of the
manufacturing employment has also a mildly negative eﬀect (Column 2) which is the combination
of a negative absolute eﬀect of initial size of the manufacturing (Lp)a n dap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of initial
share of overall employment in manufacturing (Share of Manufacturing). The negative eﬀect of
relative concentration is consistent with the ﬁndings of several previous studies such as Combes [8]
and Glaeser et al. [12].
225.2 Eﬀects of Civic Involvement and Violent Crime
Diﬀerent growth rates of employment in province-industries are indicators of the presence of
stronger or weaker agglomeration economies, at least in the long run. While some of these economies
depends on speciﬁc conditions of the province-sector, such as its concentration or degree of com-
petition, others may be induced by the presence of ”good” social characteristics in the province.
Diﬀerent sectors may beneﬁtt od i ﬀerent extents from the presence of these social characteris-
tics. Here, however, we are interested in measuring the average eﬀect on employment growth of a
province-sector, of the intensity of civic involvement and of the presence of violent crime, once we
control for the speciﬁc economic factors. Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (11) including
the social variables. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates when we include, separately, CIVIC
and Murder. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates when we include both measures without or
with nineteen regional dummies. Column 5 includes CIVIC and the murder rate measured in
1951. The advantage of such speciﬁc a t i o ni st h a tw ec a nr e l yo nam e a s u r eo fc r i m er a t ew h i c hi s
predetermined with respect to the employment growth. However the 1951 data are not available
at the province level so that we can only use crime rates at the regional level. This reduces signiﬁ-
c a n t l yt h ev a r i a n c eo fo u rm e a s u r ea n dt h ep r e c i s i o no ft h ec o e ﬃcient estimate. Finally column 6
includes each of the variables used to construct the index CIVIC rather than CIVIC itself, and
Column 7 includes the murder rate variable in non parametric form. All speciﬁcations include the
set of ﬁfteen sector dummies and the variables capturing economic determinants of agglomeration
economies. The coeﬃcient estimates on the variables Conc, Div and Compet are similar to those
reported in Table 2. I focus here on the estimates of the eﬀect of the social variables. In general a
regularity emerges across speciﬁcations. The eﬀect of CIVIC is small and never signiﬁcant, while
the eﬀect of Murder is negative, large and very signiﬁcant. Considering, for instance, the esti-
mates in Column 3, which includes sector dum m i e sa n dt h ee c o n o m i cc o n t r o l sa sw e l la sCIVIC,a
decrease of 0.1 of the murder rate (i.e. a decrease of one murder per 100,000 people) is associated
w i t h0 . 7p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sh i g h e rg r o w t ho fe m p l o y m e n ti ne a c hy e a r . E v e nc o n t r o l l i n gf o rr e -
gional dummies and relying only on within-region cross-province diﬀerences (Column 4) the above
mentioned decrease in murder rate would increase yearly employment growth by 0.37 percentage
points. To the contrary no eﬀect on employment growth is associated with diﬀerent degrees of
23civic involvement. Column 5 provides some reassurance on the direction of the causation. Even
including the regional measure of crime rate taken in 1951, which is fully predetermined relative
to the growth of employment between 1951 and 1991, we still get a signiﬁcant (at 10% level) and
negative eﬀect of this variable on growth. Unluckily a lot of the variation of crime rates is at the
provincial, rather than at the regional level, and we lose that source of identiﬁcation when we use
the 1951 regional crime rates.
Decomposing the CIVIC index into its components and estimating the eﬀe c to fe a c ho ft h e m
(Column 6) does not reveal any variable (Turnout74, AssDens and Newspaper)a ss i g n i ﬁcantly
associated with employment growth. Finally Column 7 explores the possibility of a non-linear
dependence between employment and murder rate. The preliminary analysis of employment rates in
1991 conducted in section 4 suggested that there could be a non-linear relation between murder rate
and economic activity. Only provinces with unusually high crime rates suﬀered the consequences in
t h ef o r mo fs l o w e rg r o w t ha n dd e p r e s s e dl a b o rd e m a n d .I nc o l u m n6w es t u d yt h ee ﬀect of murder
rates by including 3 dummies. The reference group is the set of regions with murder rate in the
bottom 25% of the distribution. Medium Murder correspond to the group in the 25%-50% of the
distribution, High Murder identiﬁes provinces in the 50-75% of the distribution and Ve ryHi gh
Murdersignals provinces in the top 25% of the distribution. The coeﬃcient for each of the dummies
represents the (negative) diﬀerence in yearly growth rate between a province in that group and a
province in the quartile with lowest murder rate. The coeﬃcient estimates for each dummy are
signiﬁcantly negative and their absolute value increases going from MediumMurderto Ve r yHi gh
Murder. Remarkably the diﬀerence in yearly growth rate, keeping all other determinants constant,
between a region in the top 25% and a region in the bottom 25% of the murder rate distribution is
a huge 1.50 percentage points. In forty years such diﬀerence in employment growth implies that the
average manufacturing sector employs 80% more workers in the provinces with lowest murder rates
than in those with highest. Once we control for regional eﬀects and for economic characteristics
the eﬀect of crime rate on employment growth appears rather linear.
5.3 Employment Growth in Province Manufacturing
It is useful, at this point, to go back to our aggregate provincial data to conﬁrm the impact of social
variables (Murder Rates) on overall manufacturing employment growth across Italian provinces.
24Aggregate growth in manufacturing employment during the era of industrialization of the country
1951-1991, serves as an important indicator of development. Moreover it is also instructive to
check whether the presence of organized crime has been a hurdle to development in each of two
subperiods: 1951-71 and 1971-91. We check that the negative eﬀect of violent crime on employment
growth, which we studied within sectors in the previous section, had actually a signiﬁcant aggregate
eﬀect on manufacturing employment growth and was at work in the early industrialization period
(51-71) as well as in its more mature phase (1971-91). We also inquire on the much weaker eﬀect
of civic involvement. Table 4 reports the estimates of a simple regression of yearly growth of
employment in the manufacturing sector of 95 provinces in the period 1951-1991 and in its sub-
periods on measures of their social variables at the beginning of the period. Columns 1 and 2
consider the whole sample, include initial level of employment and geographic dummies a controls.
We include each ”social variable” separately (Column 1) as well as the index CIVIC and Murder
only (Column 2). Column 3 and 4 do the same for the late sub-period (1971-91), while column 4
and 5 do it for the early sub-period (1951-1971). Notice that while the early sub-period is more
interesting in terms of industrial development (the so called ”economic miracle” took place during
those years) we have a coarser measure of murder rates for 1951 and this may aﬀect the precision
of the estimates. On the other hand the 1971-1991 period is interesting as it experienced the
fast development of small and medium enterprises, characterizing the Italian industrial districts,
while the traditionally large companies where growing at a slower pace (Becattini [3]). The results
reported in Table 4 reinforce the ﬁnding that high murder rates are associated with signiﬁcantly
lower economic growth while the variables capturing civic participation do not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect. The quantitative eﬀect of murder rates is very large. The coeﬃc i e n ti nC o l u m n2i m p l i e s
that the diﬀerence in employment growth between the safest province (murder rate =0.08) and the
most dangerous (murder rate=0.48) was a stunning 1.2 percentage points per year for the whole
1951-1991 period. Very interestingly such eﬀect is signiﬁcant and large for each of the two sub-
periods and, possibly, even larger in the second one. Taking the coeﬃcients at their ”face value” the
diﬀerence in employment growth associated to 0.4 diﬀerence in murder rates was 1.73 percentage
points per year in the 1971-1991 period.
The analysis within subperiods also allows us to check the very high stability of murder rates
across provinces relative to their employment growth. Correlation between crime rates in 1951 and
251971 is 0.70, while between 1951 and 1991 is 0.55. Correlation of employment growth rates between
51-71 and 71-91 is only 0.22. While this implies that other factors and shocks, besides criminal
presence, aﬀected employment growth in each period, they emphasize the slowly changing nature of
our independent variable (crime rates) hardly depending on recent economic success (employment
growth).
6 Conclusions: Organized Crime or Lack of Civic Spirit?
Little is known about the eﬀect of social variables on economic performance. Once we control
for institution, for the rule of law and for the political system, could diﬀerent attitudes of people
towards civic relations and the presence of criminal activity aﬀect the economic outcome of a
region? The present case study takes a ﬁrst cut at this question. The question is important because
several countries have experienced very unequal regional development (e.g. Germany, Italy) and
economic factors are often not enough to account for such inequality. Italy, on the other hand,
represents a very interesting case study, especially when we consider the period of its industrial
take-oﬀ after World War II. A period of intense industrialization could generate dynamics that
increase diﬀerences. As agglomeration forces shape the economic geography of a country, some
persistent social diﬀerences may generate virtuous or vicious cycles that set regions on diverging
paths. Italy was also the object of study of one extremely inﬂuential recent piece of research by
Robert Putnam [32] . Such study galvanized economists to study ”social capital” and to think
hard how to measure it and how to capture its eﬀects on economic development. It seemed to
us a worthwhile enterprise to study in detail, using newly collected data the relationship between
Robert Putnam’s ”Civic Spirit” and industrial development in Italy. However it seemed to us that
very little is known also about the eﬀect of violent criminal activity on industrial development,
especially at the regional level. The single and best known social problem of some regions in Italy
is certainly the presence of organized violent crime often perversely involved in criminal economic
activities. The unsafe environment and the uncertainty produced by violent crime may act as
a negative externality on economic growth and on the possibility of generating employment and
industrialization, independently from the civic attitude of people.
The result of running these two social variables (Civic Involvement and Violent Crime) one
26against the other as potential determinants of diﬀerences in employment growth and industrial
agglomeration across Italian provinces is rather clear. While the positive correlation of Civic
involvement with employment rates, industrial growth and industrial agglomerations is at best
small and scarcely signiﬁcant, the negative correlation of high rates of violent crime, measured
using the Murder rates in provinces, and industrial growth is very large and very signiﬁcant. Our
analysis ﬁnds that crime could have represented a major hurdle to industrial development for
some provinces. Some provinces in Sicily and Calabria (the two southernmost regions) might have
experienced lower employment growth by as much as 1.2 percentage points each year for forty
years, because of their very high crime rate. While the inclusion of several controls, the use of
predetermined variables, the slowly changing intensity of provincial murder-rates, all suggest that
at least part of the connection between violent crime and employment growth may be from crime
to employment, the issue deserves further research. Importantly, though, we established that the
negative correlation between violent crime and low employment growth is robust, extended to long
periods of time and not diminishing in the recent decades, while the one between civic involvement
and employment growth is rather weak. We hope that this piece of research will encourage interest
in the analysis of the relation between crime and economic success. We also hope that our results
may encourage Italian policy makers to renew their eﬀorts to eradicate violent crime in some areas
even as an eﬀective form of economic policy.
27References
[1] Baldwin R., R. Forslid, P. Martin, G. Ottaviano and F. Robert-Nicoud (2003) ”Economic
Geography and Public Policy” Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
[2] Barro R. (1991) ”Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 106, 407-444.
[3] Becattini G. (1987) “Mercato e forze locali. Il distretto industriale”, Il Mulino,Bologna, Italy.
[4] Blanchard O. (2003) ”Macroeconomics” Third Edition, Prentice Hall.
[5] Becker G. (1968) ”Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” Journal of Political
Economy, 76, 169-217.
[6] Brusco S. (1982) ”The Emilian model: productive decentralization and social integration”
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2, 167-184.
[7] Coleman J. (1988) ”Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” American Journal of
Sociology XCIV, 95-120.
[8] Combes P.P. (2000) ”Marshall-Arrow-Romer Externalities and City Growth” CERAS Working
Paper, 99-06.
[9] European Commission (2004) ”Regional Policy- Inforegion, At the Service of Regions”
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional policy/intro/regions3 en.htm
[10] Forni M. and S. Paba (2000) ”The Sources of Local Growth: Evidence from Italy” Giornale
Degli Economisti, Annali di Economia, 59 (1) 1-49.
[11] Fujita M., P. Krugman and A. Venables (1999) ”The Spatial Economy” MIT Press, Cambridge
Ma.
[12] E. Glaeser, H. Kellal, J. Scheinkman and A. Schleifer (1992) ”Growth in Cities” Journal of
Political Economy, 100, 1126-52.
[13] Glaeser E., B. Sacerdote and J.A. Scheinkman (1996) ”Crime and Social Interactions” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 112 (2) 507-548.
28[14] Gould E. Mustard D. and Weinberg B. (2000) ”Crime Rate and Local Labor Opportunities in
the United States 1979-1999” University of Georgia Working Paper No. 98-472.
[15] Grogger J. (1998) ”Market Wages and Youth Crime” Journal of Labor Economics,1 6( 4 ) ,
756-91.
[16] Guiso L. , P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2004) ”The Role of Social Capital in Financial Devel-
opment” forthcoming American Economic Review, 2004.
[17] Helliwell J. and R. Putnam (1995) ”Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy”, Eastern
Economic Journal, XXI, 295-307.
[18] Henderson V., A. Kuncoro and M.Turner (1995) ”Industrial Development in Cities” Journal
of Political Economy 103, 1067-1090.
[19] Jacobs J. (1969) ”The Economy of Cities” , New York, Vintage Books, New York 1969.
[20] Jacobs J. (1985) ”Cities and the Wealth of Nations” Vintage Books, New York May 1985.
[21] Knack S. and P. Keefer (1997) ”Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoﬀ?A C r o s s
Country Investigation” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII (1997) 1251-1288.
[22] Krugman P. (1991)”Increasing Returns and Economic Geography” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 99, 483-499.
[23] Krugman P. and A. Venables (1995) ”Globalization and the Inequality of Nations” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 110 (4) 857-880.
[24] Lederman D. , N. Loayza and A.M. Menendez ”Viol;ent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?”
Economic Development and Cultural Change 50 (3), 509-539.
[25] Leonardi R. and R. Nanetti (1990) ”The regions and European Integration, the case of Emilia
Romagna” Pinter Publisher, London UK
[26] Leonardi R. and R.Nanetti (1994) “Regional development in a modern European Economy,
The case of Tuscany” Pinter publisher, London UK.
29[ 2 7 ]L o c h n e rL .a n dM o r e t t iE .( 2 0 0 1 )” T h eE ﬀect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison
Inmates, Arrests and self-reports” NBER Working Paper N. 465.
[28] Machin S. and Meghir C. (2001) ”Crime and Economic Incentives” Institute for Fiscal Studies,
Working Paper 2000/17
[29] Mauro P. (1993) ”Corruption and Growth” Quarterly Journal of Economics CX, 681-712.
[30] Murphy K., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1993) ”Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?”
American Economic Review 83, 409-14.
[31] Porter M.(1990) ” The Competitive Advantage of Nations” New York Free Press 1990.
[32] Putnam R.(1993) ”Making Democracy Work” Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
[33] Rosenthal S.R. and W. Strange (2003) ”Evidence on the Nature and Sources of Agglomeration
Economies” in The Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, Vol.4 V. Henderson Editor,
Elsevier Science.
[34] Sah R. (1991) ”Social Osmosis and Pattern of Crime” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1272-
95.
[35] Soares R. (2004) ”Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the international
diﬀerences in crime rates” Journal of Development Economics, 73, 155-184.
[36] Temple J. and Johnson P.A. (1998) ”Social Capability and Economic Growth” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113, 965-990.
30A Data Appendix
A.1 Census Data
The data on employment for the sector-province and for the total manufacturing sector at the
province level are from the Italian Census of Manufacturing, published by ISTAT (the Italian
Institute of Statistics), and held every ten years between 1951 and 1991. In 1996 ISTAT made
available in electronic format the data on total employees and establishments, homogenized across
the Census 1951-61-71-81 and 91 at the Municipality (Comune) level. The ﬁle (cis.txt) was released
with the electronic data of the Census 1996 and it is available from the author upon request, together
with the sas program used to extract the variables. The growth rates of employment as well as the
variables Conc,Div and Comp have been constructed using these data. The summary statistics of
these variables are reported in table A1 below.
Table A1  
Summary Statistics of the variables Used in the Regrassions 
 
 





Yearly growth rate 
 of employment: 1951-1991 
0.5% 2.9%  -16% +8% 
Conc.  0.1 0.9  0.01  0.70 
Div.  0.8 0.06  0.44  0.94 
Compet.  1.7 1.8  0.02  13 
Share of Manufacturing  0.41 0.11  0.18 0.71 
 
The sectors within manufacturing for which it was possible to reconstruct a consistent deﬁnition
between 1951 and 1991 are the following 15 (we report in parentheses the Italian census code
associated to each sector): Food and Beverages (3010), Tobacco (3020), Leather (3030), Textile
(3040), Apparel and Shoes (3050), Wood and Furniture (3060), Paper products (3070), Printing
(3080), Metal Products (3090), Machinery and Vehicles (3100), Non Metal Mineral Products (3110),
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (3120), Rubber Products(3130) Plastic and other manufacturing
industries (3140).
The 95 provinces used in the regressions are listed in the Table A2 below. We also indicate the
31region and the geographical area of the country (North-East, North-West, Center, South) in which
they are located.
  TABLE A2 
province region  Area  province  region  Area 
Torino Piemonte  North-West  Firenze  Toscana  Center 
Vercelli Piemonte  North-West  Livorno  Toscana  Center 
Novara Piemonte  North-West  Pisa Toscana  Center 
Cuneo Piemonte  North-West  Arezzo  Toscana  Center 
Asti Piemonte North-West  Siena  Toscana  Center 
Alessandria Piemonte  North-West  Grosseto Toscana  Center 
Aosta Valle  d'Aosta  North-West  Perugia  Umbria  Center 
Imperia Liguria  North-West  Terni  Umbria  Center 
Savona Liguria  North-West  Viterbo  Lazio  Center 
Genova Liguria  North-West  Rieti  Lazio  Center 
La Spezia  Liguria  North-West  Roma  Lazio  Center 
Varese Lombardia  North-West  Latina  Lazio  Center 
Como Lombardia North-West  Frosinone  Lazio  Center 
Sondrio Lombardia  North-West  Caserta  Campania  South 
Milano Lombardia  North-West  Benevento  Campania  South 
Bergamo Lombardia  North-West  Napoli  Campania  South 
Brescia Lombardia  North-West  Avellino  Campania  South 
Pavia Lombardia North-West  Salerno  Campania  South 
Cremona Lombardia  North-West  L'Aquila  Abruzzo  South 
Mantova Lombardia  North-West  Teramo  Abruzzo  South 
Bolzano Trentino-Alto  Adige  North-East  Pescara  Abruzzo  South 
Trento Trentino-Alto  Adige  North-East  Chieti  Abruzzo  South 
Verona Veneto  North-East  Campobasso  Molise  South 
Vicenza Veneto  North-East  Isernia  Molise  South 
Belluno Veneto  North-East  Foggia  Puglia  South 
Treviso Veneto  North-East  Bari Puglia  South 
Venezia Veneto  North-East  Taranto  Puglia  South 
Padova Veneto  North-East  Brindisi  Puglia  South 
Rovigo Veneto  North-East  Lecce  Puglia  South 
Udine Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  North-East  Potenza  Basilicata  South 
Gorizia Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  North-East  Matera  Basilicata  South 
Trieste Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  North-East  Cosenza  Calabria  South 
Pordenone Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  North-East  Catanzaro  Calabria  South 
Piacenza  Emilia-Romagna  Center  Reggio di Calabria  Calabria  South 
Parma Emilia-Romagna  Center  Trapani  Sicilia  South 
Reggio nell'Emilia  Emilia-Romagna  Center  Palermo  Sicilia  South 
Modena Emilia-Romagna  Center  Messina  Sicilia  South 
Bologna Emilia-Romagna  Center  Agrigento  Sicilia  South 
Ferrara Emilia-Romagna  Center  Caltanissetta  Sicilia  South 
Ravenna Emilia-Romagna  Center  Enna Sicilia  South 
Forli'-Cesena Emilia-Romagna  Center  Catania  Sicilia  South 
Pesaro e Urbino  Marche  Center  Ragusa  Sicilia  South 
Ancona Marche  Center  Siracusa  Sicilia  South 
Macerata Marche  Center  Sassari  Sardegna  South 
Ascoli Piceno  Marche  Center  Nuoro  Sardegna  South 
Massa-Carrara Toscana  Center  Cagliari  Sardegna South 
Lucca Toscana  Center  Oristano  Sardegna  South 
Pistoia  Toscana  Center          
32A.2 Social Variables
The variables used to construct the index CIVIC are those originally suggested in Putnam [32].
We referred to his sources and, where possible, we collected them at the province level. The
variable AssDens is the number of associations per 1,000 people. The count of association, local
and national, by province was manually made by a research assistant from the 1982 census of
Italian associations (”Le Associazioni Italiane” a cura di A. Mortara, Franco Angeli, Milano 1985).
The count of people is taken from the Annuario Statistico Italiano, ISTAT, 1983. The variable
Turnout74 is equal to the electoral turnout for the referendum held in 1974 on the legalization of
the Divorce. The source of the data is Forni and Paba (2000) and we also checked the Annuario
Statistico Italiano, ISTAT 1975. The variable Newspaper is equal to the share of people reading
non-sport newspaper in the population for year 1974. The source is Annuario Statistico Italiano,
ISTAT 1975, under the Chapter ”Statistiche Culturali e Sociali Varie”. Such variable is available
at the regional level only, so we assigned the same value to provinces within the same region.
The variable Murder (1971) used in most regressions is the murder rate per 10,000 inhabitants
calculated averaging the rates in 1970-71 and 72 from Forni and Paba (2000). They collected the
data from Annuario di Statistiche Provinciali, ISTAT 1971-73. The variable Murder for the year
1991 was obtained from the publication ”Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali”, ISTAT 1993. For the
variable Murder Regional 1951 we used the publication ”Un Secolo di Statistiche Italiane: Nord
e Sud” SVIMEZ, Roma, 1961 which under the mortality statistics and cause of death reports the
number of murders in 1951 by region. We used the population count from the census 1951 to obtain
the murder rate.
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Cross Sectional Correlates of Employment Rates  
















































































Geographic Dummies  No  No  Yes No  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Turnout74        0.005** 
(0.001) 
   
Association Density        0.05 
(0.05) 
   
Newspaper        0.008 
(0.01) 
   
R
2  0.51 0.52  0.59 0.54  0.61 0.53  0.55  0.54 
Observations  95 95  95 28  95 95  95  28 
Instrument          Murder71 Murder51 Murder
51 
R
2 of first stage IV            0.35  0.32  0.32 
 
Notes:   
Dependent Variable= Private Sector Employment Rate in 1991 calculated as number of Employees in the private sector of the economy relative to 
the population within 16-64 years of age.  
In parentheses Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.  
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Murder (1991): Number of murders per 10,000 inhabitants. Year 1991. 
CIVIC: First principal component of the variables Turnout74, AssDens, Newsp (defined below). The equation defining CIVIC is (1) in the text. 
Secondary: Share of the population with a secondary school degree, year 1990 
Tertiary: Share of the population with a tertiary degree (College), year 1990 
Geographic Dummies:  Three dummies for province being in the North East, North West, Center of the Country (dummy South is omitted) 
Turnout74:  Percentage of participants to the Referendum elections in 1974 
Association Density: Number of association per 1,000 people in the province, 1980 


















Table 2  
Economic Determinants of Agglomeration Economies: 
Employment growth in Sector-Provinces 1951-1991 
 
Specification 1  2  3  4 




































Sector-Dummies  No Yes  Yes  Yes 
20 Regional Dummies  No No  No  Yes 
Observations  921 921  921  921 
R
2  0.06 0.56  0.57  0.63 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: Average yearly growth rate of employment in the sector-province, 1951-91. 
In parentheses: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by province.  
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
Lp, 1951: Total employment in Manufacturing in the province, year 1951 
Conc: Employment in Sector i province p relative to total manufacturing employment in province p, year 1951.  
Div: Index of Sector-Diversity within manufacturing: 1-∑ ≠i j jp sh
2
1950) (  , shjp1950 is the share of employment in 
sector j for the manufacturing sector of province p in 1950. 
Compet: Index of local Competition. Average number of Firms per Employee in the sector-province relative to 






Economic and Social Determinants of Agglomeration Economies 
 
Specification  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 











































































Murder Regional 1951       - 2 . 0 0 *  
(1.20) 
  
Medium Murder (0.03-0.044)           - 0 . 6 2 * *  
(0.23) 
High Murder (0.044-0.07)           - 1 . 0 7 * *  
(0.26) 
Very High Murder (>0.07)           - 1 . 5 6 * *  
(0.35) 
Turnout74         0.02 
(0.03) 
 
AssDens         0.14 
(0.43) 
 
Newspaper         1.69 
(1.20) 
 
Sector-Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
20 Regional Dummies  No No No Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  921 921 921 921  921  921  921 
R
2  0.56 0.57 0.58 0.63  0.56  0.63  0.65 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: Average yearly growth rate of employment in the sector-province, 1951-91, in percentage points. 
In parentheses: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by province except in Column 5 where they are 
clustered by region. 
Conc, Div and Compet defined as in Table 3. 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
 
Social Variables: 
CIVIC:  index of civic involvement constructed as the first principal component of the variables Turnout74, AssDens and Newsp. 
Murder (1971): Number of Murders per 10,000 inhabitants, year 1971 
Murder Regional 1951: Number of Murders per 10,000 inhabitants, data are at the regional level, year 1951. 
Medium Murder: Dummy equal to one in Provinces with murder rate (Murder) between  0.03 and 0.044. 
High Murder: Dummy equal to one in Provinces with murder rate (Murder) between  0.044 and 0.07. 
Very High Murder: Dummy equal to one in Provinces with murder rate (Murder) larger than 0.07.  
Turnout74:  Percentage of participants to the Referendum elections in 1974 
AssDens: Number of associations per 1,000 people in the province, 1980 













Growth of Employment in Province-Manufacturing 
And Social Variables 
 
Specification 1 2 3 4  5  6 
period  1951-1991 1971-1991  1951-1971 
ln(Employment) 




















































Geographic Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  95 95 95 95  95  95 
R
2  0.44 0.41 0.58 0.57  0.38  0.30 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: Average yearly growth rate of manufacturing employment in the province, in percentage points. 
In parentheses: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Errors are clustered by province, except in regression 5 
where they are clustered by region 
ln(Employment): logarithm of employment in private manufacturing in the province at the beginning of the period.  
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
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